Welfare Effects of Tax and Price Changes Revisited by Knud J., MUNK
Département des Sciences Économiques
de l'Université catholique de Louvain
Welfare Effects of Tax and Price Changes Revisited
Knud J. Munk
Discussion  Paper   2008-6 
 





Université catholique de Louvain and University of Aarhus 
 




Dixit’s 1975 paper "Welfare Effects of Tax and Price Changes" constitutes a seminal contribution to the 
theory of tax reform analysis within a second-best general equilibrium framework. The present paper 
clarifies ambiguities with respect to normalisation which have led to misinterpretation of some of Dixit’s 
analytical results. It proves that a marginal tax reform starting from a proportional tax system will improve 
social welfare if it increases the supply of labour, whatever the rule of normalisation adopted, and shows that 
this result provides the key to understanding what determines the optimal system of commodity taxation as 
reflected in the Corlett and Hague analysis of optimal taxation in an economy with two produced 
commodities. Recasting work by Deaton (1981b), it generalises, using an alternative definition of the 
complementarity between consumption and leisure, to an economy with many commodities the insight that 
the optimal tax system is determined as a trade-off between two objectives: 1) to encourage the supply of 
labour to the market, and 2), to limit the distortion of the pattern of consumption of produced commodities. 
This insight cannot be illustrated by simulation studies using standard additive separable utility functions. 
However, extending work of Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) the paper presents a parameterised utility 
function with explicit representation of the use of time, the CES-UT, which allows a flexible representation 
of the relationship between consumption and leisure. This functional form is used to provide a quantitative 
illustration of the trade-off which defines the optimal tax system and thus desirable directions of tax reform. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Dixit’s (1975) seminal paper ”Welfare Effects of Tax and Price Changes” constitutes an 
seminal and important contribution to the general equilibrium approach to optimal tax 
analysis. Furthermore, from the start of the development of the theory of optimal taxation in 
the 1970s, simulation studies have been used as a way to provide such insight. However, the 
policy implications of Dixit’s analytical results have remained elusive. 
 
We suggest two reasons (among others) for this. First, the ambiguity in the specification of 
rules of normalisation in Dixit’s original contributions from 1975 (and 1970) seems to have 
provided a barrier to the recognition of the importance for desirable directions of tax reform 
of the interaction between the consumption of purchased commodities and the untaxed use of 
the primary factor (“leisure”). Second, the straitjacket imposed on the representation of 
household behaviour in simulation studies by the generalised application of additive 
separable utility functions which has made it impossible to represent this interaction. 
 
The purpose of this paper is double: first, to reinterpret Dixit’s analysis; second, to provide an 
alternative to the functional forms widely used in Computable General Equilibrium models 
and other applied work. Methodologically, the paper is rooted in the contributions by Dixit 
(1975, op. cit), Dixit and Munk (1977) and Munk (1978, 1980) which emphasise the 
importance of a full articulation of the general equilibrium assumptions and the advantages of 
using a dual approach as the basis for tax reform and optimal tax analysis. More generally the 
analysis is embedded in the modern theory of optimal taxation established in the 1970s by 
Mirrlees, Stiglitz, Atkinson, Stern, Dixit, Deaton, Sandmo and others. Specifically it draws 
inspiration from, and builds on Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981). Their starting point was, as 
here, the limitation of tax simulations studies based on additive separable functional forms. 
Based on the observation that goods are usually purchased for use in particular activities, and 
that these activities involve the use of time, they proposed the use of utility functions based 
on the explicit representation of the use of time to assess the consequences of the introduction 
of a VAT. 
 
We first specify three alternative interpretations of the model formulated in Dixit (1975,) and 
on this basis generalise Proposition 1 in Munk (1978) concerning the rules of normalisation 
in such models. Furthermore, based only on formulations of the conditions for general 
equilibrium under alternative assumptions about the tax base, we provide an intuitive insight 
into what determines desirable direction of tax reform and optimal commodity taxation. On 
this basis we identify ambiguities in Dixit’s model formulation. Using an alternative rule of 
normalisation, but the same method of analysis, we reformulate two theorems in Dixit (1975, 
op. cit.). 
 
Secondly, with the same motivation as Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981), we show how the 
explicit representation of the use of time can help to improve the understanding of what 
constitutes desirable directions of tax reform and also what determines the optimal system of 
taxation. In an attempt to dispel confusion in the literature on this point, we illustrate, just 
based on properties of homogeneity of demand functions and profit functions, that 
incorporating household production in the household’s utility function does not modify the 
results of optimal tax theory. The results of Corlett and Hague’s (1953) analysis of optimal 
taxation is thus valid also with the explicit representation of household productions, even 
when household production is associated with decreasing returns to scale. In particular we   3
show that the presence of shadow profit in household production does not compromise the 
Diamond-Mirrless Theorem of Production Efficiency, as have been alleged. 
 
Thirdly, we illustrate, recasting work by Deaton (1981b), how insight derived from the 
Corlett and Hague analysis of optimal taxation in an economy with two produced 
commodities, can be generalised to an economy with many commodities using an alternative 
definition of the complementarity between consumption and leisure. 
 
Finally, we analyse the properties of demand systems based on the CES-UT parameterisation 
of utility functions with the explicit representation of the use of time (see e.g. Munk 1998). 
The analysis suggests that the use of this functional form can contribute to the deeper 
understanding of what determines desirable directions of tax reform and systems of optimal 
taxation. We also demonstrate how, based on the CES-UT specification of household 
preferences, it is possible to derive a system of demand elasticities which can be compared to 
estimates calculated by econometric methods. In this context we emphasise that in contrast to 
utility functions based on the Becker specification, utility functions based on CES-UT 
parameterisation imply that commodities which require relative large amount of time for their 
consumptions are not necessarily complementary with the untaxed use of labour (“Leisure”) 
and for that reason should not necessarily attract relative high rates of taxation. 
 
In the process we relate the results to the existing literature. 
 
 
2. The setting  
 
Following Dixit (1975, op.cit.), we consider a competitive economy with one representative 
household and a government, where there is one primary factor, labour, labelled 0, and N 
produced commodities labelled 1,..,N. We denote the set of commodities FC and the set of 
produced commodities C. The household’s vector of endowments is  ( ) 0,0,..,0 ω ≡ ω , its 
vector of consumptions  ( ) 01 ,. , N cc ,c ≡ c , and its net trade vector thus  ( ) 01 N ,. , xx ,x ≡ ≡− xc ω . 
The primary factor can best be thought of as time, making  0 x  labour measured negatively, 
and  0 c   the household's consumption of its time endowment, traditionally referred to as 
"leisure", but better called “the household’s untaxed use of labour”. Consumer prices are 
( ) 01 ,. , N qq ,q ≡ q  and  producer  prices  are  ( ) 01 N ,. , p p, p ≡ p . The government's resource 
requirements, 
G ≡ x ( )
GG G
01 N ,. , x x,x , are financed by commodity taxes,  ≡− tqp . The 
government’s expenditures are thus  '
G G ≡ px . The household's preferences are represented 
by a differentiable, strictly quasi-concave utility function,  ( ) u c . Production possibilities are 
represented by production functions ,  ( ) 0
ii
i yf y = , i=1,..,N, where  i y is the production of 
commodity i, and  0
i y  the use of the primary factor in its production, which take the form 
00
ii
i ya y = , i=1,..,N when a linear production structure is assumed. 
 
The government's resource requirements, 
G ≡ x ( ) 01 ,. ,
GG G
N x x,x , are financed by commodity 
taxes,  ≡− tqp . For a tax system, t, to be feasible, i.e. for it to be compatible with a market   4
equilibrium, the three basic conditions for Profit maximisation,  Utility maximisation and 
Material balance have to be satisfied, as well as the condition for the government’s budget to 
be balanced and a number of tax-price equations. 
 
In the case of constant returns to scale, the conditions for profit maximization may be 
expressed as  
  00
ii
i ya y =      i  ∈ C (1) 
 pa p i0
i
0 =      i ∈ C (2) 
Using the dual approach, as in Dixit (1975, op. cit) and Dixit and Munk (1977), household 
behaviour in terms of its choice of net trade,  ( ) 01 N ,. , x x, x ≡ x , may be expressed as
1 
   () u = q xE q ,     (3) 
  ( ) ,0 Eu = q      (4) 
where expenditure function, ( ) , Eu q , is the value function corresponding to the problem 
() { } min '  s. t. uu =
x qx ω-x . 
 
Material balance requires  
        
G
ii i yx x =+     i  ∈ C (5) 
00  0      
G x x =+      (6) 
Assuming that commodity taxation is based on net trade, the government’s budget constraint 
is 
'( ) '
G u = q tE q , px      (7) 
where commodity taxes are 
  =− tqp    (8) 
By successive substitution equation (1) to (8) may be reduced to 




aE q u x
∈
+ ∑  +  ( ) 0 ,  Eq u  + 0
G x  = 0  (9) 
( ) ,0 Eu = q  (10) 
'( ) '
G u = q tE q , px  (11) 
=− tqp  
   (12) 
                                                 
1 Using the subscript notation, we write net demand functions, as  { } () () ,
i ux u i F C ≡∈
q Eq , q ,  and gross 
demand functions, as  { } () () ,
i ucu i F C ≡∈

























qq Mq , .   5
By Walras' law we can delete (9). Under the assumption that taxation is based on net trade, 
and that there is no profit (Case 1, Figure 1b), the conditions for t  to correspond to an 
equilibrium situation may thus be expressed as 
  () 0 Eu = q,      (13) 
'( ) '
G u = q tE q , px    (14) 
≡− tqp    (15) 
Under the alterative assumption that taxation is based on consumption,  () 01 N ,. , cc ,c ≡ c , and 
assuming that there is no profit, (Case 2, Figure 1a) the conditions for t to correspond to an 
equilibrium situation may be expressed as  
00 () M up ω = q,      (16) 
'()'
G u = q tM q , px     (17) 
≡− tqp    (18) 
where ()     , M u q is the full income expenditure function, defined as the value function for the 
problem  () { } min '  s. t. uu =
c qc c . 
 
Finally, assuming that taxation is based on net trade, and that the household receives profit 
income, () 0 I =Π > p , (Case 3, Figure 2a and 2b), the conditions for t to correspond to an 
equilibrium situation become  
 () ( ) Eu =Π q, p      (19) 
'( ) '
G u = q tE q , px    (20) 
≡− tqp    (21) 
Equations (13), (16) and (19) requires the level of utility to be consistent with household 
income, which in Case 2 is the value of the endowment of the primary factor, and in Case 1 
and Case 3 the profit associated with production in the formal sector. In Case 1 this is nil. 
Equations (14), (17), and (20) may be interpreted as the government's budget constraint. In 
each case the three equations represent all the general equilibrium conditions for t  to be 
feasible (cf. Dixit and Munk 1977).   6
Figure 1a: Taxation of consumption 
 
Consumption of the produced commodity, production 
  11 , cy   

























11 , cy  




0 c                     
*
0 y                  0
G y             0 c  Consumption of labour 
Household            Labour input   Government   
consumption of                            consumption of 
labour (Leisure)            labour 
              Endowment of labour  0 ω  
 
 
Figure 1b: Taxation of net purchase 
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Figure 2a:  Taxation of net purchases. Value of profit greater than the government’s 
requirement 
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Figure 2b: Taxation of net purchases. Value of profit less than the government’s requirement 
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3.  The rules of normalisation and intuitive insight into what 
determines the optimal tax system 
 
By the homogeneity of degree zero of compensate demand and the homogeneity of the profit 
function of degree 1, in all the three cases considered multiplying consumer prices, q, and 
producer prices, p , by the same constant, leaves the equilibrium conditions satisfied. 
Multiplying only q or  p   by a constant, the equilibrium conditions in Case 1 remain 
unaffected, but in Case 2 and 3 the value of the endowment and the value of the profit to the 
household, respectively, is affected. By the same type of proof as in Munk (1978) this leads 
to the following extension of Proposition 1 in that article. 
 
Proposition 1: In tax models at least one price (either a producer price or a consumer price) 
must be fixed in order for there to be a unique solution to the maximisation 
problem. However, if taxation is based on net trade (rather than 
consumption), and if  
a) 100% tax is imposed on profit, or  
b) there are constant returns to scale,    
  then one consumer price and at least one producer price must be fixed. 
 
It follows from Proposition 1 that in the case of taxation based on net trade, when the 
household receives no profit income, one commodity may be assumed untaxed as a matter of 
normalisation, as is customary in optimal tax models. However, it is not the case that one 
commodity  must be assumed untaxed to have a unique solution. A totally adequate 
normalisation rule is to assume that the tax on one commodity, say labour, is fixed at some 
value other than 0. 
 
Having established the proper rules of normalisation, it is easy by similar reasoning, without 
recourse to the mathematical theory of constrained maximisation, to establish the following 
proposition concerning the solutions to the government’s problem of maximising social 
welfare under alternative sets of assumptions (cf. Munk 1978). 
 
Proposition 2: When taxation  
a) is based on net trade and there is no profit, then an optimal solution must 
involve distortion of consumer prices relative to consumer prices and thus 
always be second best;  
b) is based on consumption the first best solution can always be established by a 







=∈ ;  
c) is based on net trade and profit income IG > , then the first best solution can 







=∈ ;  
d) is based on net trade and profit income IG < , then only a second best 







≈∞ ∈ . 
 
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate this insight. Figure 1 illustrates that a first best solution is always 
possible in Case 2, but never in Case 1.  Figure 2 illustrates that whether a first best solution   9
is possible in Case 3 depend on the size of the profit relative to the value of the government’s 
revenue requirement.  
 
Since without loss of generality we in Case 1 can assume that  00 p q = , adding this constraint 
to the governments problem in Case 2, results in the same optimal solution as in Case 1. This 
provides a good starting point for identifying what determines desirable directions of tax 
reform in Case 1 (the standard case considered in the theory of optimal taxation). Adding 
00 p q =  in Case 2 not only makes it impossible to achieve the first best solution, but it also 
clearly involves a substitution away from the consumption of produced commodities towards 
the consumption of leisure, and hence a discouragement of the supply of labour compared 
with the first best solution. In other words the distortion created by having to raise 
government revenue by distortionary taxes rather than by lump sum taxation, is thus basically 
that the supply of labour to the market is discouraged; (compare Figure 1a with Figure 1b). 
 
The changes in prices from the first best allocation where the consumption of all commodities 
including leisure are taxed at the same rate to “a proportional tax system” (where only the 
consumption of the produced commodities are taxed at the same rate or where only the 
supply of labour is taxed), clearly makes the consumption of leisure more attractive compared 
with the consumption of all other commodities taken together. Such a price change will 
therefore - compared with the first best allocation - increase the household's consumption of 
leisure. However, it is in general possible, while keeping the government’s revenue constant, 
to reduce this distortion by increasing the tax rates on the commodities which are highly 
complementary to leisure and reducing those on commodities which are less so. This suggests 
that starting from a proportional tax system, increasing tax rates on those commodities which 
are highly complementary with leisure, and decreasing them for those which are less 
complementary, will increase social welfare. 
 
However, it is also clear that doing so creates another distortion. The marginal rates of 
substitution in consumption between produced commodities become different form the 
marginal rates of transformation in production. As the supply of labour is increased, the 
marginal costs in terms of welfare of this distortion will increase. This suggests that the 
optimal tax system is achieved where the marginal gain in terms of encouragement of the 
supply of labour corresponds to the marginal loss in terms of distortion of the pattern of 
consumption of produced commodities. In other words, the optimal tax system represents a 
compromise between two objectives: 
 
1)  the objective of  encouraging the supply of labour to the market,  0 x , (Objective 1), 
and 
2)  the objective of limiting the distortion of the pattern of consumption of produced 
commodities ,  i x iC ∈ , (Objective 2). 
 
In Section 4 and 6, respectively, we provide formal proofs of these conjectures about what 
constitute desirable tax reforms, and about what characterise optimal systems of taxation.   10
4. Reinterpretation of some analytical results 
 
The condition that the value of the expenditure function is equal to household income we 
have indicated in the three cases considered by (13), (16) and (19), respectively. Dixit (1975) 
writes  ( 1 ,,) Eq u ZTP =−+as a generic condition for equilibrium covering all these three 
cases. In Dixit’s notation, P is untaxed profit, T  is a lump sum tax and Z other income. 
Assuming that lump sum taxation is not available to the government, i.e.  0 T = , the 
equivalent expression in our notation, in Case 2, is  0 Z ω ≡  and  ( 1 ,,) (,) Eq u M u ≡ q , in Case 1 
and 3,  0 Z ≡  and  ( 1 ,,) (,) Eq u E u ≡ q , and in Case 3,  () P = Π p . Dixit (1975, op. cit. p, 106) 
thus in all the three cases assumes that  00 1 pq = = . By doing so Dixit obscures the distinction 
between the behavioural assumption that the household use of the primary factor cannot be 
taxed, and the assumption that the supply of the primary factor to the market is untaxed. The 
former assumption constrains the set of feasible solutions, while the latter does not. This 
leads Dixit to misinterpret his analytical results. Dixit’s analysis was in Dixit and Munk 
(1977) reinterpreted taking into account that in Case 3 labour cannot be assumed untaxed 
without loss of generality. The present paper reinterprets some of Dixit’s results for Case 1 
drawing insight that also in Case 2, which is in itself not a case of particular interest, that 
labour cannot be assumed untaxed without loss of generality. 
 
Analysing the effect of a tax reform in Case 1 starting from a proportional tax system, 
,  i TT iC =∈ , we adopt the same analytical approach as Dixit (1975, op. cit), but do not 
initially make any assumption about normalisation. Such a tax reform changes the 
equilibrium consumer price vector to ( ) d + qq , and the utility to ( ) d uu + , leaving the 
government’s revenue unchanged.  For simplicity we assume a linear production structure 
such that producer prices may be assumed fixed.
2 
 
Taking total differentials of (13) and (14), we obtain 
 dd 0 u u += q EqE    (22) 
 d' d' d 0 u u ++= qq qq Eqt E qt E    (23) 
Solving for du, using that  =− tqp , and that by homogeneity that  ' u q qE =  u E , we have 
 d' d u =Φ qq tE q    (24) 
where  () 1/ ' uu Φ= + q Ep E. We assume that ( ) '0 uu + > q Ep E  (see Dixit 1975, op. cit, p107 
for justification). 
                                                 
2 With variable producer price and in the presence of profit, if the profit is taxed at 100%, one commodity may 
also be assumed untaxed without loss of generality. The optimal tax rules are the same as in the case of a linear 
production structure, but the analysis is complicated by producer prices being endogenous (see Munk and Dixit 
1977 and Munk 1978).   11
We now define  0 − t  and  0 d − q  as equal to the corresponding vectors where the 0
 th element has 
been removed,  
00 −− qq E   as equal to  qq E , where the 0
th row and the 0
th column has been 
removed, and 
00 − q E  as equal to the first row of  qq E . Assuming that  0 d0 q =  we have 
 
00 0 00 00 0 'd ' d t
−− − −− − =+ qq q q q tE E q t E q    (25) 
If we assume that the initial tax system is proportional, i.e. that the supply to the market of 














With reference to Proposition 1 , we fix  0 0 t <  as a matter of normalisation. We now consider 
a tax reform which changes consumer prices by  0 d − q . Substituting for  ' qq tE  in (9) using (10) 
we have 
 






−− − −− −
− ⎛⎞ =Φ + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
qq q Eq q E q  (26) 
Since by the homogeneity of degree zero of 
0 − q E in q, 
00 0 00 0 '0 q
−− − − + = qq q Eq E ,  and by the 
symmetry of demand derivatives, 
00 − q E =
0
'











− ⎛⎞ =− Φ − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
q Eq    (27) 
Substituting in (27) by 
0 000 dxq
− = q E , the change in the supply to the market of the primary 
factor (measured negatively), for 
0 00 d
− − q Eq , and exploiting the symmetry of the derivatives of 
compensated demand, we have 






− ⎛⎞ =Φ − > ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
   (28) 
The following proposition provides the interpretation of this equation. 
 
Proposition 3: In a competitive economy with constant producer prices and one primary 
factor, in an equilibrium with a proportional tax system in terms of the 
produced commodities, a small change in tax rates holding commodity tax 
revenue constant will increase welfare if the changes in tax rates result in an 
increase in the compensated supply of the primary factor. 
 
A increase in the tax on commodity j balanced by a decrease in the tax on a commodity i 
changes the compensated supply of the primary factor by (see Dixit op. cit. p116) 
  00 0 d ii j j x Ed t Ed t =+   (29) 
  00 0 0 0 d iii j j j x xdt xd t ασ ασ =+    (30)   12
where  0 0 ii i qx q α ω ≡ and where  0 k σ , k=i,j, are Allen (or Allen-Uzawa)  elasticities of 
substitution.be defined as 
 












     , ij F C ∈  
where  () , M u q  is the full income expenditure function. 
 
For a tax reform to be welfare improving it follows from (22) that  0 ii j j xd t xd t + <  and thus 
that 
  ( ) 00 0 0 d ji j j x xd t σσ α ≤−    (31) 
A welfare increasing tax reform, which balance an increase in the tax on commodity j by a 
reduction in the tax on commodity, will thus, if  00 ij σ σ > , increase the supply of the primary 
factor ( ) 0 d0 x < . Combining this result with Proposition 3, we obtain (cf. The Corlett and 
Hague 1953 analysis reviewed below) the following proposition which confirms the first 
conjecture formulated in Section 4. 
 
Proposition 4: In a competitive economy with constant producer prices and one primary 
factor, in an equilibrium with a proportional tax system, a small decrease in 
the tax on one commodity balanced by a increase of the tax of another 
commodity less complementary with the untaxed use of the primary factor than 
the first commodity, will increase welfare. 
 
Dixit's Theorem 6
3 follows from Proposition 4 when “the numeraire” is replaced by “the 
household’s untaxed use of the primary factor”.  The theorem  is not valid if any other 
commodity than the primary factor is chosen as untaxed numeraire. To see this, consider the 
case where in the initial equilibrium the tax system is proportional with  0 1,  1 TT <= . In this 
case any of the produced commodities may be considered an untaxed numeraire, but the 
Dixit’s theorem does not apply with that choice of numeraire. The theorem suggests that the 
degree of complementarity with the untaxed  numeraire is important for what constitutes 
welfare improving directions of tax reform. The importance of the link to the untaxed 
numeraire is coincidental, attributable to the fact that Dixit has chosen as numeraire the 
commodity of which the household has an initial endowment, i.e. the primary factor. 
 
Dixit's Theorem 7
4 may similarly be reinterpreting by replacing “the numeraire” by “the 
untaxed use of the primary factor”. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Dixit (1975, op cit)’s Theorem 6 says “In a competitive economy with constant producer prices and an initial 
equilibrium with equal proportional distortions, a small change in tax rates holding commodity tax revenue 
constant will increase welfare if all commodities whose prices and lowered are better substitutes for the 
numeraire that all those whose prices are raised” 
4 Dixit (1975, op cit)’s Theorem 7 says ”Lowering the price of any one commodity towards its marginal cost 
will increase welfare if the commodity is complementary to all those with a greater proportional distortion and 
substitute for all other including the numeraire”   13
5. Adding structure to the representation of household preferences 
 
With the same motivation as Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) we now address the task of 
creating a framework which can be used for simulation studies to enhance intuition for the 
results presented above and to provide the basis for applied tax reform analysis. An essential 
requirement for such a framework is that it, in contrast to standard functional forms, does not 
impose separability between consumption of produced commodities and leisure. 
 
5.1  Household preferences with the explicit representation of the use of 
time 
 
In order not to impose the unrealistic assumptions of additive separable utility functions I 
have followed the same path as earlier taken by Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) of 
incorporating household production in the household’s utility function in the spirit of 
Becker’s theory of household production. In applied work I have adopted a utility function, 
which allows the interaction between the consumption of produced commodities and leisure 
to differ between produced commodities (see Munk 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2008). I have used 
a utility function with an explicit representation of the use of time, 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
01 2
011 0 22 0 0 ,, ,, , . . , ,
N









=− + ∑  is “pure leisure”
5. For each composite good,  i C , the preference 
for the amount purchased of the commodity,  i x , and the time used for its consumption,  0
i c , is 
expressed by a concave functions  0 (,)
i
ii i CC x c = , i∈C. These functions may be interpreted 
as representing either household production or consumption activities
6. "Leisure" or “non-
market use of time” is therefore 
0




cx c c ω
∈
= += + ∑ .   ( )
0
01 2 ,,, . . , N UcCC C  I have assumed 
to be strictly quasi-concave. 
 
                                                 
5 “Pure leisure” is thus defined as the amount of time spent on activities, which are not associated with the 
consumption of purchased commodities or the supply of labour to the market. We are not here going to be 
drawn into a philosophical discussion of whether “pure leisure” exits from an ontological point of view. Any 
scientific theory has to be developed in such a way that it can be applied to data that are available, or at least can 
potentially be made available, and not by trying to represent the world as it “really” is. For empirical purposes 
we interpret “pure leisure” as non-market use of time which cannot be related to the consumption of any specific 
commodity, for example as time used for relaxation in one’s home which typically involves the use of many 
durable commodities at the same time. The motivation of  the definition is thus pragmatic, to improve the 
quality of work otherwise constrained by the unrealistic assumption of separability between consumption of 
produced commodities and the consumption of nonmarket use of time. 
6 The aggregation functions, 
0 (,) ,  
i
ii CxciC ∈ , may be interpreted as household production functions, or as just 
constraining household preferences. In the first case, a composite commodity,  i C , is a physical entity resulting 
from the combinations of a purchased commodity and time, as in the case of food prepared in the home; in the 
second case, the composite commodity is just a theoretical construct helping to represent the household’s 
preferences, as in the case of childcare where alternative combinations of non-marketed time and the purchase 
of a marketed commodity can satisfy the same well-defined need. The one interpretation may be used for one 
application and the other for another, but it does not matter for the formal analysis undertaken here.   14
The assumption that the household maximises utility subject to its budget constraint may, 
using the expenditure function approach, be expressed as 
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where  N 01 ,u E(q ,q ,..,q ) is an expenditure function with standard properties.  
 
Assuming that the functions  0 (,)
i
ii i CC x c = , i∈C, are homogenous of degree 1, we may 
define prices for the composite commodities as 
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and  
  ( ) ( )
0
012 0 0 01 N
, ; ,  C
, , ,.., , Min  , ,..,  ..   =
i
Ni i
iF C i cC
EqQQ Q u q c Q C UcC C st u
∈ ∈
≡+ ∑   (35) 
The function  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 010 1 202 0N , , , , ,.., , , N EqQq q Q q q Q q q u   -  0 q 0 ω   is an expenditure 
function with standard properties which represent the same preferences as N 01 ,u E(q ,q ,..,q ) . 
This follows from  ( ) 012 , , ,.., , N EqQQ Q u  , and  ( ) 0, ii i QqqC,  i∈C being expenditure 
functions with standard properties
 7. This is an essential point; it implies that the 
corresponding demand system can be analysed using standard demand theory, and that the 
insight from standard tax reform analysis can be applied directly. That we can apply standard 
results is not only of considerable analytical convenience, but also facilitates the 
interpretation of results as was pointed out by Atkinson and Stern (1980)
8. But in order to 
exploit these advantages, it is naturally important, as emphasised in Munk (2001), to make a 
correct mapping of the variables from the utility function with explicit representation of the 
use of time to the utility function in its standard form, Let us to clarify this, write 
( ) 01 ,,
i
i GqqCfor the cost function associated with  0 (,)
i
ii i CC x c =  as in Munk (1980). The 
conditions for maximisation of (shadow) profit of household production may then be 
expressed as  
  ( ) 0,,
i
ii i i x GqqC = ,  i∈C   
  ( ) 00 0 ,,
ii
ii cG q q C = , i∈C   
  ( ) 01 ,,
i
i
iC i QGq q C = , i∈C    (36) 
                                                 
7 See also see Pollak and Wachter (1975) 
8 Atkinson and Stern (1980) write: In the formal sense [a model incorporating home production] is no different, 
and we can apply the standard theory of demand, a fact which is worth emphasising in view of the claims 
sometimes made to the contrary. That we can apply standard results is a considerable analytical convenience, 
and allows us to see more clearly how the interpretation of the results differs [when incorporating home 
production]    15





































In the case of a standard utility function the household’s preferences are defined on net trade, 
01 N , ,.., x xx . In the case of a utility function with the explicit representation of the use of time, 
the household’s preferences are defined on pure leisure,
0
0 c , and the consumption of 
composite commodities,  , .., 1 N CC . What we have shown is that the behaviour implied by the 
utility function with explicit representation of the use of time, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
01 2 N
011 0 22 0 NN 0 ,, ,, , . . , , UcC xc C xc C x c , corresponds to that of an utility function with  
standard properties,  ( ) 01 N , ,.., ux x x , defined on net trade. 
 
The net trade vector  ( ) 01 N ,. , xx ,x ≡≡ − x ω c  indicates the household’s interaction with the 
rest of the world, which in optimal tax theory is the only aspect of household behaviour, 
which is assumed to be observable by the government. The use of utility functions with the 
explicit representation of the use of time provides more power to the explanation of changes 
in x in response to price changes than the use of standard utility functions, but remains, as 
we have seen, a special case of the general formulation. It is thus inconceivable that optimal 
tax results obtained for the general case should not be applicable to cases where household 
preferences are represented by utility functions with the explicit representation of the use of 
time. 
 
We can thus express the household maximisation problem in two ways which are entirely 
equivalent, as was pointed out by Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981). We can incorporate 
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or we can add the condition for profit maximisation in the household sector to the household 
maximisation problem, 
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( ) 0,, ii i i x cqqC = , i∈C 
  ( ) 00 0 ,,
ii
ii cc q q C =  , i∈C 
  ( ) 0,,
i
ii i i Qq q C =Π  , i∈C 
  ( ) ( ) 01 01 ,, ,,
ii
ii i i qqC Q C GqqC Π≡ − ,  i∈C 
 
As long as the sub-utility functions representing household production,  0 (,)
i
ii i CC x c = , i∈C, 
are well behaved concave functions, household production may be interpreted as a special 
case of a utility function  ( ) 01 , ,.., N ux x x  satisfying standard conditions of quasi-concavity 
and monotonicity. The explicit representation of household production thus does not 
compromise the application of general theorems of consumer theory and the theory of 
optimal taxation. This is one of the great advantages of incorporating the representation of 
household consumption in the utility function. The optimal solution to the household 
maximisation problem in terms of  ( ) 01 , ,.., N ux x x   thus remains the same  whether it is 
formulated as (37) or (38)  As has been stated in Munk (2001), the suggestion by Kleven, 
Richter and Sørensen (2000), quoted by Boadway and Gahvari (2006) and Sørensen (2007), 
that household consumption provides a counter example to the Diamond and Mirrlees 
Production Efficiency Theorem is therefore misguided. It seems based on a misunderstanding 
of both the role of the interaction between the consumption of produced commodities and the 
“consumption of leisure” which in optimal tax models in the Diamond-Mirrlees tradition 
should be understood as the household’s untaxed use of labour, and not as the term “leisure” 
may be used in common language. In particular it is worth noticing that the Diamond and 
Mirrlees Production Efficiency Theorem does apply in the presence of untaxed profit in the 
informal sector, as stated in Munk (2001), and as formally spelt out here. Diversion from 
production efficiency is desirable in the case of untaxed profit in the formal sector only if 
restrictions are imposed on the set of commodity taxes; if such restrictions are imposed the 
rationale for taking the characteristics of the production structure into account is that it allows 
the value of the profit income accruing to the household to be reduced (see Munk 1978, 
1980). As considering the household’s maximisation problem as expressed in (38) 
demonstrates, the value of the informal sector profit is invariant to a proportional increase in 
consumer prices. Representing household production as a separate untaxed production sector 
therefore does change neither the optimal tax structure nor the rational for why commodities 
should be taxed at different rates according to their complementary with the untaxed use of 
the primary factor. This insight follows from the first formulation of government’s problem 
of finding an optimal solution, (37). However, it is may be more clearly seen from the second 
formulation, (38). As the household budget constraint is unaffected by a proportional increase 
in all prices, we can assume labour untaxed as is customary in optimal tax models without 
loss of generality. It is instructive, to contrast the case of untaxed profit in the household 




6. Characterisation of the optimal tax structure 
 
We now address the question of how to provide a formal characterisation of the optimal tax 
system in order to provide a formal proof of the second conjecture formulated in Section 4.   17
 
6.1  The standard analysis 
 
The government’s maximisation problem may be represented by 
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where  0 L = . 
 
The corresponding Lagrangian expression may therefore be written as 
 
  () ii
 iF C
(+ ) (+ ,) uL E u t Eu L G μλ
∈
⎛⎞
=+ −− + +− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑ pt , pt L  (40) 
By properties of Lagrangian multipliers, the net marginal social value of income for the 
household, is the increase in social welfare if the income of the household were increased by 
one unit from outside the economy (cf. Diamond 1975) and λ ,  the marginal social 
opportunity cost price of government funds, if it is the government which receives the income 
transfer. 
 
The first order conditions for an optimal solution with respect to u,  L and  () 01 N , ,.., qq q ≡ q , 
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Notice that if lump sum tax were feasible, then the two other first order conditions would be 
satisfied for  0 = t , i.e. only the lump sum tax instrument would be used and the optimal 
solution would be first best. 










. From (41) we then have that 
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=− θ ∑ q ,   k∈FC (45)   18
where  λ μλ θ≡( − )/ . 










=− θ ∑∑ qt x    (46) 
 













λ> = + ∑
q
   (47) 
i.e. if the tax revenue is positive then the social value of an increase in government 
revenue,λ , is larger than the net social marginal utility of income, μ . Notice that whether 
β λ>  depends on normalisation.
 9 
 
6.2  The optimal tax system in the case of two produced commodities  
 
Choosing the primary factor, commodity 0, as untaxed numeraire the first order conditions 
for an optimal tax structure (45) may in an economy with only two produced commodities in 
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α= , we may rewrite (49) as  
                                                 
9 Contrary to the impression which may be obtained from some authors, the sign of 
- λ β
λ
 is not always greater 
than zero. The value of 
- λ β
λ
 depends on the rule of normalisation adopted. If 
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As own compensated price elasticities,  ii ε , are always negative,  
  10 σ < 20 σ  imply  12
12
tt
qq >  
 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of (50) we define the Indicator of the objective of 
maintaining the first-best pattern of consumption of produced commodities (Objective 1) as 
 
  11 1 2 2 I ε ε ≡− −  
  ( ) 12 1 2 1 I σ ≡α+ α  
 
and the Indicator of the objective of increasing the supply of labour (Objective 2) as 
 
  21 02 0 I ε ε ≡−  
  ( ) 20 1 0 2 0 I σ σ ≡α −  
 
The optimal price formula (50), thus imply the following: 
 
•  Which commodity will be taxed at the highest rate, depends entirely on the sign of 
10 20 ε ε −  
 
•  For a given value of  11 22 ε ε −−, the difference is the greater, the greater the numerical 
value of  10 20 ε ε −  
 
•  For  given values of  10 ε and  20 ε ,  the difference is the smaller the greater is  11 22 ε ε −−. 
 
The larger is  1 I , i.e. the larger is   12 σ  the larger are the distortionary costs of differentiating 
the tax rates between the produced commodities, and for given values of  10 ε  and  20 ε  the 
difference in tax rates are smaller the greater is  1 I , in other words the greater the cross price 
elasticity between the two produced commodities. 
 
The larger  2 I  is numerically, i.e. the larger is the difference in complementary ( ) 10 20 σ σ −  
and the larger the share of pure leisure,  0 α , the larger are the gains of differentiating the 
percentage tax rates between the produced commodities.  
 
Which commodity will be taxed at the highest rate depends entirely on the sign of  2 I  and, for 
given value of  1 I , the difference is the greater the greater the numerical value of  2 I . 
6.3  The optimal tax system in the case of many produced commodities 
   20
The result of the Corlett and Hague analysis cannot formally be generalised to an economy 
with more than two produced commodities. This has lead to attempt to gain insight inter what 
constitutes the optimal tax structure by making restrictive assumptions.  
 

























When i=k, rewriting (51) we get  








θ ε =+ −    i∈FC  (52) 
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=
=+ ∑
h x , and 
where the expenditure function is therefore also additively separable (cf. Atkinson and 
Stiglitz 1980), the compensated cross price effects are zero. Assuming labour untaxed as a 
matter of normalisation, the optimal tax formula (51) reduces to the so-called inverse 
elasticity formula  




θ ε = −    i∈C (53) 







θ ε =    i∈C (54) 
Therefore taxing commodities with numerically small own price elasticities at relative high 
rates corresponds to taxing commodities that are highly complementary with leisure at high 
rates. The optimal tax system may therefore alternatively be seen as encouraging the labour 
supply compared to a proportional tax system based on the produced commodities by having 
higher taxes on commodities which are complementary with leisure, i.e. where  0 i ε  is small. 
The question is indeed if the inverse elasticity rule is not more misleading than enlightening 
as it only applies in the very special case where there is no conflict between the two in 
general competing objectives which determine the optimal tax system.
10 
 
                                                 
10Furthermore, as is not always emphasised, the validity of the inverse elasticity rule requires that the income 
elasticity of all produced commodities are zero, or in other words that any increase in lump-sum income is used 
only to increase the consumption of leisure; an implication which is blatantly in contradiction all empirical 
evidence.   21
6.4  Derivation of optimal tax formula using the distance function 
 
It is in fact possible to characterise the optimal tax system in the case of many commodities 
as a trade-off between the two objectives identified in Section 3, however this requires the 
use of another concept of complementarity between consumption and leisure than employed 
in the Corlett and Hague analysis. We demonstrate this with reference to Deaton (1981b)’s 
much neglected analysis of optimal commodity taxation using the distance function.  
 
The concept of complementarity may be defined based on the Allen elasticity of substitution, 
ij σ , as used in the Corlett and Hague analysis, or based on the less well-known Antonelli 
elasticity of complementarity defined as 












 , ij F C ∈  
where  ( ) , Du c  is the distance function (cf. Deaton 1981b)
 11.  
Definition 1: Two commodities i and j are net p-complements (substitutes) for a given level 
of utility if an increase in the price of the j
th commodity increases (decreases) the quantity 
consumed of the i
th commodity (keeping the prices of all other commodities constant), i.e. if 
( ) 00 ( ) . ij ij σ ≥< ≠   
Definition 2: Two commodities i and j are net q-complements (substitutes) for a given level 
of utility, if an increase in the consumption of the j
th commodity increases (decreases) the 
marginal valuation of the i
th commodity keeping the consumption of all other commodities 
constant, i.e. if  ( ) 00 ( ) . ij ij ρ ≥< ≠  
 
The two concepts are linked since the distance function may be defined from the full income 
function. Let q   be the vector of normalised commodity prices whose elements are  ii qq M =  , 
i=0, …,N, where M  is full income. By the homogeneity of degree 1 of  () , M u q  we have 

















The distance function may thus be defined as 
  ( ) ( ) { } ,m i n s . t .   ,1 Du M u ≡≥ q cq c q    (57) 
                                                 
11 The distance function gives the maximum amount by which the consumption vector must be deflated or inflated to reach 
the indifference curve associated with u. The distance function is increasing, linear homogenous, and concave with respect to 
x , and decreasing in u.  
   22
Application of Shepard’s lemma to the distance function yields the system of compensated 
inverse demand functions,  ( ) , i au c , iF C ∈  











c    iF C ∈  (58) 
Inverse demands measure the marginal evaluation of the consumption of commodities by the 
household. The linear homogeneity of the distance function implies that  ( ) ( ) ,, ii Duau ≡ cc  is 
homogenous of degree zero in x , and its concavity implies that the matrix 






⎧⎫ ∂ ⎪⎪ ≡ ⎨⎬
∂ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
c
 is negative definite and symmetric. The inverse demand functions thus 
possess similar properties as the ordinary compensated demand functions  ( ) , i M u q , iF C ∈ . 
 
The necessary conditions for an optimal tax structure,(45), may in matrix notation be written 
as  





























⎢ ⎥ ≡ ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ −θ ⎣ ⎦
b , 
As  = q Ec - ω, (59) may be rewritten as 
  ( ) =− θ qq Et c - ω    (60) 
Pre-multiplying by  qq D  and  using  that  = qq qq ME  and  that  1 M = qq qq MM  (see (56)), we 
have 
  ( )( ) =− θΜ qq qq DMt c - ω     (61) 
The Antonelli matrix { } ij D  is the generalised inverse of the Slutsky matrix { } ij M  , i.e. 
 ' I =− qq qq DM q c    (62) 
We therefore have 
  ( ) ( )( ) ' I −= − θ Μ qc t c-ω     (63) 
and thus that   23
  ( ) ( ) ' =− θ Μ qq tq c t D c - ω     (64) 
Since  0 = qq Dc  
  ( ) ' =+ θ Μ tq c t D ω     (65) 
Substituting by the government’s budget constraint,( )' G − = c ω t , we get 
  ( ) ( ) ' G =++ θ Μ tq ω tD ω     (66) 
Multiplying by  ' ω  we have 
  ( ) ( ) '' ' ' G =+ + θ Μ ω t ω q ω t ω Dω     (67) 
Assuming as a matter of normalisation that labour is untaxed, i.e.  0 0 t = , and thus that 
'0 = ω t , we have 
  ( ) 0' ' G =+ θ Μ ω q ω Dω      (68) 
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  , kj C ∈ (74) 
Assuming that all  00 0 0 j ρ ρ −> >  are positive, it follows that the commodity which is most q-
complementary with leisure will be taxed at the highest rates. Note that the smaller is  00 ρ  
numerically, the greater is the concavity of the indifference surface and hence the cost of 
distorting the relative prices of the produced comodities. Thus, the smaller is  00 ρ , 
numerically, the greater is the role of Objective 1, to encourage the labour supply, in 
determining the optimal tax rates. Note also that the ranking of the tax rates is independent of 
the rule of normalisation adopted. 
We are therefore able to convey an intuitive, yet rigorous explanation of what determines the 
optimal tax system as conjectured in Section 4 as follows 
 
Proposition 5: The optimal tax system represent a compromise between two objectives: First, 
that of not distorting the pattern of consumption of the produced commodities 
(Objective 2), represented by  00 ρ , and second, that of discouraging the 
untaxed consumption of the primary factor (Objective 1), represented by 
00 jk ρ ρ − . 
 
The analysis has thus made clear that the appropriate concept of complementarity in relation 
to the interpretation of optimal tax formulae which may be expressed using Antonelli 
elasticities of substitution. This seems not generally to have been recognised. 
 
6.5  The optimal tax structure in the case of a Becker approach the 
representation of household production 
12 
 
Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) used a Stone-Geary utility function augmented taxation. 
This utility function may be considered as a special case of the utility function with explicit 
representation of time specified in Equation (32), where  ( )
0
01 2 N , , ,.., UcCC C   is a Stone-
Geary utility function and  ()
1
0 ,,   ii Cx c iC ∈   are Leontief functions
13. The corresponding 
expenditure function is  
( ) , Eu ≡ q ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 010 11 2022 02 ,, ; ,, ; , . ., ; ; , , , , NN i i EqQq q Q q q Q q q i F C i F Cu αα α γ β ∈∈    (75) 










≡+ − ++ − ∑ ∏  (76) 
where  i γ and  i β  are parameters of the Stone Geary utility function. Estimating this functional 
form on British survey data for Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) discovered significant 
difference in the time requirement of different goods (high for tobacco, low for services). 
 
                                                 
12 This section was written based on Munk (2000a and 2000b) prior to Kleven (2004), see Munk (2001). 
13 However, this utility functions is not as the assumed in Section 2 differentiable.   25
The advantage of this specification is that it easy to estimate, but it seems too restrictive to be 
suitable for tax reform analysis. To see this consider the general formulation of the utility 






= T>1, i∈FC, based on the consumption of all commodities, including leisure. Such a 
tax system is, as we have seen, a first-best solution whatever the structure of the household’s 
preferences. Such a tax system involves higher consumer prices,  ( ) 01 N '' , ., Tp Tp , Tp ≡ q , and 
thus higher prices for composite commodities,  ( ) 0 '' , ii i Q Q Tp Tp = , i∈C than the first-best 
solution based on lump sum taxation where the prices for composite commodities are 
( ) 0 ', ii i QQ p p = , i∈C. 
 
If we impose the constraint that leisure cannot be taxed, i.e. that  00 qp = , it is, as we have 
seen in Section 3, in general not possible to achieve the first-best solution. Although it is 
possible to choose tax rates for produced commodities to generate prices for composite 
commodities which create no distortion between the composite commodities such tax rates 
will involve higher prices for produced commodities relative to the price of non-market use 
of time. Distorting the allocation between the consumption of produced commodities and 
time within the aggregation functions for the composite commodities,  0 (,)
i
ii Cxc,  i∈C, 
therefore in general results in a second best solution. 
 
However, considering the intrinsically not very interesting case where all the aggregation 
functions for the composite commodities,  0 (,)
i
ii Cxc,  i∈C, are Leontief (and thus not 
differential as assumed in Section 2), and where the household’s consumption of pure leisure, 
0
0 c , is nil
14, distorting the price ratio between produced commodities and time does not distort 
the allocation, as pointed out by Kleven (2000). A tax vector where leisure is untaxed will 
therefore establish a first-best solution if the tax rates on produced commodities are chosen so 
that the relative prices for the composite commodities are the same as if the government’s 
resource requirement had been financed by a proportional tax system based on the 
consumption on all commodities, i.e. if  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 00 , 1 / ( 1) , 1 / ( 1) ii i i i Qpp t Q p p ττ += − −     i∈C (77) 
 
where τ <1 is the rate of tax on the household’s endowment of time net of the fixed amount 
used for pure leisure required to finance the government’s resource requirement. Since for 
this utility function the aggregation functions are Leontief 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 00 '1 / ( 1 ) 1 1 ii i i i i i i Qq a p a q a q t a τ =− − + = − + +   i∈C (78) 
 











  i∈C (79) 
 
                                                 
14 This is the case if  ( )
0
01 2 N , , ,.., UcCC C is Leontief or if the household consumes no pure leisure.     26




t a j k
qj
=      ,C kj    ∈ (80) 
 
Commodities that require relative much time for their consumptions, i.e. where  i a is 
relatively small, is thus taxed at a relatively high rates.  
 
Kleven (2000) derives a formula similar to (80) from the government’s problem of 
maximising the utility of a representative household subject to constraints representing the 
government’s budget and household production and by assuming that the household 
consumes no pure leisure. However his derivation was somewhat flawed
15, and the method 
used in Kleven (2004) is similar to the one used here. Furthermore, inspired by Myles (1995, 
p124)
16, due to lack of understanding of the proper rules of normalisation Kleven (2000) fails 
to interpret this formula as equivalent to a proportional tax system based on the consumption 
of all commodities, as in Munk (2000a and 2000b). 
 
The functional form used by Atkinson and Stern (1980) for tax reform analysis therefore 
implies that the optimal solution is first best, in other words that the solution need not be 
associated with distortionary costs even when lump taxation is not available to the 
government. In general this is not an assumption one would like to make in tax reform 
analysis. 
                                                 
15 From the government’s problem of maximising the utility of a representative household subject to constraints 













+  = −       ∈ ∑ , and then derives (80) from this expression assuming a Becker type 
representation of household production, i.e. that 
1 0,
kk kC ε = ∈ . Strictly speaking this cannot be done as in the 
case of a Leontief specification of the aggregation functions for the composite commodities, 
0 (,)
i
ii Cxc, i∈C, 
the solution to the government’s maximisation problem is first best and thus  0 θ = .  
16 Myles (1995, p124) writes “It has been shown that in an economy with constant returns to scale consumer and 
producer prices can be normalised separately and that standard procedure is to make one good the numeraire and 
set the consumer and producer prices equal. This normalisation also has the effect of setting the tax on that good 
to zero. In particular, the zero tax is just a result of the normalisation rule. In particular, the zero tax carries no 
implication about the nature of the good nor about the ability to tax that good. This follows since the good with 
zero tax can be chosen arbitrarily from the set of available goods. Unfortunately, this reasoning has not been as 
clearly appreciated in some literature, it has been inferred from this that, since leisure cannot be measures in the 
same way as purchase of other commodities can, the zero tax on leisure is a restriction on the permissible tax 
system brought about by an inability to tax leisure. In addition the further inference is usually made that the 
optimal tax system aims to overcome this missing tax on the leisure by taxing goods complementary to leisure. 
Particular examples of this is found in the Corlett and Hague (1953) by ‘taxing those goods complementary with 
leisure, one is to some extent taxing leisure itself’ (p. 26) and Layard and Walters (1978) ‘the theory of second 
best tells us that if we cannot tax leisure we can do better than by taxing all goods equiproportionally’ (p. 184). 
Many other instances of similar statements could easily be given. This of course is a false interpretation. When 
real restrictions upon the permissible range of tax instruments are introduced the result obtained are affected. A 
number of such restrictions are considered in Munk (1980) where it is shown that the resulting optimal tax 
structure is sensitive to the precise restrictions imposed” 
   27
7. Quantitative  illustration   
 
7.1  The CES-UT utility function 
 
Figure 3: The structure of the CES-UT utility function for N=2 
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The parameterised utility function, CES-UT is defined as (cf. Munk 1998, Annex 1) 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
01 1 1 2 1 2 N 1 N 2 3
01 1 0 2 2 0 N N 0 , , ; , , ; ,.., , ; ; UcCC xc C xc C x c σ σσ σ σ  (81) 
where 
1
; 0 (, )
ii
ii Cxc σ ,  i∈C,  ( )
2
12 N ,, . . ,; CC C C σ  and  ( )
03
0 ,; UCcσ   are CES functions 
characterised by elasticities of substitution 
1i σ , i∈C, 
2 σ  and 
3 σ , respectively. The structure 
of the CES-UT is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
We want to demonstrate that the CES-UT is quite flexible with respect to representation of 
household preferences in particular, allowing different commodities to have different degrees 
of complementarity with leisure. 
 
Differentiating (14) we get the corresponding demand system  
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≡  as the share 
of the costs of the consumption of commodity j in the total costs of composite j (which 






≡  the share of the composite j in 
the total cost of consumption (including the consumption of time except pure leisure), we get 
 
CC ii ii i ii i i aa b
12 3 ε= ε+ ε+   ε      iC ∈  (84) 
   
CC ij j ij j j aa b






















ε= ε+ − ) ε + ε ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑     iC ∈  (87) 




ii i i a σ
11 ε= ε= − − , 
2 for C ij j bi , j i σ
2 ε =≠ ∈  
( )
2 1 f o r   ii i bi C σ
2 ε= − − ∈  and 
0 (1 )
CC C c σ







, we have 
  ( ) ( )
12 11 ( 1 )
i
ii i i i i i aa ba b c σ σσ
3 ε= − − − − − −     iC ∈  (88) 
 
2 (1 ) ij j j j j ab ab c σ σ
3 ε= − −        , ij C ∈  (89) 
  ( ) ( )
12
0 1( 1 )
i
ii i aa a a c σ σσ
3 ε= − + − − −     iC ∈  (90) 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
12
0 1( 1 )
i
ii i i aa a a c α σσ σ







It is thus possible to link the parameters of the CES-UT with estimates of  ij ε ,   , ij F C ∈ , 
readily available from econometric estimates of flexible functional forms (which however 
cannot be used in simulation studies because they globally do not satisfy the assumptions of 
quasi-concavity and monotonicity). 
 
The elasticities of substitution between the commodities and leisure, io σ ,   iC ∈ , are related 
to the compensated elasticities by  00 ii o s σ ε=  where  0 s  is the share of labour income in full 
                                                 









0 ii i ε ε = −  and 
0
33
CC C ε ε =− .   29
income,  00 q ω . Differences in  0 i ε  therefore reflect differences in the complementarity with 
leisure of the different commodities. 
 
The compensated elasticity of commodity i with respect to the price of labour,  0 i ε , depends 
on three elements (see (86)): The within element, the between element and the pure leisure 
element. 
 





1 ε= − . This element 
is always positive with respect to the value of  0 i ε , and is larger, the larger the amount of time 
used for the consumption of commodity i, ( ) 1 i a − , and the larger the elasticity of substitution 
between time and the commodity within the composite commodity i, 
1i σ . 
 
The  between element is represented by the second term:  ( )
2
C





−) ε = − ∑ . This 
element may be positive or negative with respect to the value of  0 i ε  depending on whether 
commodity i requires a relatively large amount of time for its consumption, i.e.  i aa < , or 
relatively small amount, i.e.  i aa > . In the first case, an increase in the price of the 
commodity and hence in the corresponding composite commodity results in a shift to 
composite commodities which involve the use of relatively less time, drawing in the direction 
of a small  0 i ε ; in the second case the opposite will be the case, drawing in the direction of a 
relatively large  0 i ε . The elasticity between composite commodities, 
2 σ , amplifies the effect 
whatever its direction. 
 
The pure leisure element is represented by the third term: (1 ) ac σ
3 −  is always positive with 
respect to the value of  0 i ε . Furthermore the larger the share of the household’s time 
endowment used for pure leisure (1 ) c −  and the larger the elasticity of substitution between 
leisure and consumption, σ
3, the larger is this element.  
 
In particular we see that 
 
1) for  i aa > , i.e. when a relatively small amount of time is used for the consumption 
of commodity i, then relatively large substitution elasticities 
1i σ , 
2 σ  imply relatively 




1i σ   , i.e. when the between element dominates, then a relatively large 
amount of time, (1 i a −) , used for the consumption of commodity i imply a relatively 
small  0 i ε , but 
 
3)  for 
2 σ <
1i σ  , i.e. when the within element dominates, then a relatively large amount of 
time, (1 i a −) , used for the consumption of commodity i implies a relatively large  0 i ε . 
   30
Indicators for Objective 1 and 2 (see Section 6.2) becomes, respectively  
  1 I = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
11 12 2
1 1 1122 1 1 2 2 1 1 (1 (1 (1 ) a a ab ab a b a b c σ σσ σ
3 − +− + −)   + −)   +   +   −  
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21 11 2








≡ :share of the costs of the consumption of commodity j in the total costs of 





















7.2  Quantitative results for alternative sets of parameter values 
 
Table 1: Parameters 
 
    Set 1  Set 2  Set 3  Set 4 
Elasticity of substitution between commodity 
1 and the time used for its consumption 










Elasticity of substitution between commodity 
2 and the time used for its consumption 










Elasticity of substitution between the 
composite commodities 










Elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and pure leisure 










Share of time in composite commodity 1 
in benchmark 









Share of time in composite commodity 2 
in benchmark 



















The benchmark data and the parameters specified imply that the value of the household’s 
endowment is 300 
 
Since the governments requirement is 50, a tax on the value of endowment at rate τ = 1/6 
would therefore be sufficient to raise the revenue required for the government without 
distorting the resource allocation   31
 
In the case of such a tax, the real income for the household would be 100 
 
 
Optimal tax system for Parameter set 1 (Leontief):  
 
Assuming that the share of full income spent on pure leisure, 1-c,  is fixed at 0 and that the 
elasticities of substitution within the commodity composites, 
11 σ  and 
12 σ  are fixed at 0, there 
are no scope for substitution between consumption of produced commodities and leisure 
within the commodity composites and between aggregate consumption and pure leisure. 
























    
For this set of parameters the optimal solution is first-best, although lump sum taxation is not 
possible. The intuitive explanation is that it effectively raises the price of time by the same 
amount for all uses as had the revenue been raised directly by a tax on the household’s 
endowment. At the optimum there is therefore no conflict between the two objectives. 
 
 
Optimal tax systems for Parameter sets 2-4:  
 
1 I , the indicator for Objective 1 (Distortion of the pattern of consumption of produced 




3 σ . The 
larger the elasticities, the larger the distortionary costs of a differentiated tax structure.  
 
2 I , the indicator for Objective 2 (Increasing the supply of labour) increases with increasing 
elasticities of substitution, 
11 σ ,
12 σ ,




2 σ  is complex. To facilitate the interpretation of the optimal tax formulae we 
therefore consider the less general case where 
11 12 1 σ σσ = = . Then 
  ( )
12
11 1 2 2 12 12 (2 (1 ) Ia a a a a a c σ σσ
3 =ε +ε =− − − ) − + −   − −  (92) 
  ( ) ( )
12
21 02 0 12 12 Ia a a a σ σ =ε −ε =−   −   +   −    (93) 
The first term,  ( )
1
12 aa σ −  −   , the within effect, is the substitution effect within the composite 
aggregation functions, 
1
110 (,) Cxc and 
2
220 (,) Cxc. This effect is positive (i.e. the effect on the 
supply of labour is negative) if  1 a < 2 a . The second effect, ( )
2
12 aa σ  −   , the between effect, is 
due to the substitution between composite commodities within the aggregation function 
12 (,) CC C . This effect is negative (i.e. the effect on the supply of labour is positive) if  1 a < 2 a .   32
The relative strength of the two effects determines the sign of  2 I , and thus which commodity 
is taxed at the highest rate. 
 
For example, for 

















     (94) 
Conversely for 
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Table 2: Indicators for objective 1 and 2 and the corresponding optimal relative tax rates 
 
 Indicator  for 
Objective 1. 
  1 I 
Indicator for 
Objective 2. 
  2 I 
Optimal relative tax 
rates 
12 / tt  
Set 1  0,180  -0,150  3,50 
Set 2  0,330  0,080  0,38 
Set 3  0,280  -0,150  3,45 
Set 4  0,390  0,000  1,00 
 
It is intuitively plausible that the commodity, which requires the relatively largest amount of 
time for its consumption, is relatively most complementary with leisure and therefore should 
be taxed at the highest rate. However, as the analysis of the CES-UT illustrates, this intuition 
may be misleading. In the situation where the substitution possibilities within the time-
consumption composites are relatively large the indicator for Objective 2 will be greater than 
1 if the share of time in composite 1 is smaller than in composite 2. In this case commodity 1, 
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Table 3: Optimal tax rates for alternative sets of parameter values  
 
Results    Set 1  Set 2  Set 3  Set 4 
Tax on labour  0 t   0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tax on consumption of commodity 1  1 t   1,40 0,22 1,45 0,55 
Tax on consumption of commodity 2  2 t   0,40 0,58 0,42 0,55 
Labour supply   - 0 x   150,00 142,30 146,42 141,52 
Consumption commodity 1   1 x   10,00 9,29 9,64 9,15 
Consumption commodity 2   2 x   90,00 83,00 86,78 82,37 
Real income    100,00 98,21  99,17  98,02 
 
It is thus relatively easy by specifying different values of the parameters of the CES-UT,  i a , 
1i σ , 
2 σ , to represent different degrees of complementarity with leisure for the different 
commodities. In contrast to the additive separable utility functions, as the CES, the CES-UT 
therefore allows the complementarity with leisure to differ between commodities. 
Furthermore each of the parameters of the CES-UT has a clear economic interpretation, 




8.  Concluding remarks and summary 
 
The standard model used for tax reform and optimal tax analysis which emerged in the 70ties 
assumes labour to be untaxed. However, in the presence of (untaxed) profit and when 
households’ consumption of their primary factor endowment can be taxed, this assumption 
cannot be considered a rule of normalisation in the sense that it does not imply any loss of 
generality. Dixit and Munk (1977) reinterpreted the analytical results in Dixit (1970) and 
Dixit (1975) taking into account the first point concerning untaxed profit. The present paper 
deals with the second point where the households’ endowment can be taxed. Although the 
analysis of this particular case in itself is of little practical importance, the ambiguity with 
respect to normalisation seems to have created a barrier for the proper understanding of what 
determines desirable directions of tax-reform and optimal systems of commodity taxation in 
the subsequent literature by confusing  the issue of normalisation. As indicated above an 
example of this in an influential and widely used textbook on Public Economics is Myles 
(1995). 
  
Much applied work, and in particular work based on the use of general equilibrium models, 
adds structure to the general representation of household preferences by employing additively 
separable utility functions. However, seen from the point of view of the theory of optimal 
taxation this representation of household behaviour severely limits the flexibility of the 
resulting demand system. When only efficiency considerations matter, the assumption of 
additively separable utility functions implies that optimality requires taxation of all produced 
commodities at a uniform rate or, equivalently, only a proportional tax on the households 
supply of labour to the market. As eloquently put by Deaton (1981a, p1) “it is likely that 
empirically calculated tax rates, based on econometric estimates of parameters, will be   34
determined in structure, not by the measurement actually made, but by arbitrary untested (and 
even unconscious) hypothesis chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience”. This 
motivated Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) to employ a Stone-Geary utility function 
augmented with the explicit representation of the use of time according to the Becker (1965) 
theory of household production. Importantly, they drew attention to the results established by 
Pollack and Wachter (1975), that when incorporating household production in the utility 
function, the standard theory of demand still apply. They estimated based on British survey 
data a demand system which they used to evaluate the implication of a switch from direct to 
indirect taxation. However, although they justified their approach with the importance for the 
optimal tax system of the interaction of consumption with leisure, they did not take their 
analysis to its logical conclusion. They neither did investigate whether a tax reform involving 
higher taxes on goods with high time requirement would increase welfare, nor did they derive 
optimal tax rates for the demand system they estimated. Their choice of a Leontief 
specification of the relationship between the use of time and consumption, inherent in the 
Becker approach, is attractive in that it allows the estimation of a complete system of 
household demand based only on panel data but very restrictive. A much less restrictive and 
still computationally manageable alternative is to represent the relationship between the use 
of time and consumption of purchased commodities by a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) functions rather that by Leontief functions. This specification has been employed to 
analyse the optimal support to low income household (Munk 1998), the welfare implication 
of green tax reform (Munk 1999) and recently to illustrate the importance of the size of the 
informal sector for the desirability of using border taxes in developing countries Munk (2004, 
2008). 
 
We have drawn attention to the importance of the distinction between the behavioural 
assumption that the consumption of the primary factor cannot be taxed and the assumption 
that the supply of the primary factor to the market is untaxed. The former assumption 
constrains the set of feasible solutions, while the latter does not. We have explained why 
ambiguity with respect to this distinction has created a barrier for identification of what 
constitute desirable directions of tax reform, and thus for what determines the optimal tax 
system. Reviewing Dixit (1975)’s original analysis, we have provided an intuitive 
explanation of what determines the optimal tax system as a trade-off between two objectives: 
1) the objective of not distorting the consumption of produced commodities, and 2) the 
objective of encouraging the supply of labour, emphasising that this insight does not depends 
on the choice of numeraire as has been suggested. In recasting Deaton’s important but largely 
neglected work on using the distance function for optimal tax analysis, we have brought out 
this interpretation in the case of many produced commodities. Finally, we have thus in the 
spirit of the endeavour by Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) provided a parameterisation of a 
utility function with the explicit representation of the use of time, the CES-UT, which may be 
used to illustrate this trade-off. This may in applied work be used as an alternative to 
functional forms, which as they impose separability between consumption and leisure, may 
result in misleading conclusions from tax simulations studies.   35
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